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Forced to Freedom? 
Empirical relations between aid and economic freedom 
Abstract 
The paper explores the relationships between economic freedom on the one side and de-
velopment aid and IMF credit as approximation for conditional aid on the other side. 
After a short review of current literature on the issue of economic development, eco-
nomic freedom, aid, and IMF credit, the paper develops a simple panel regression model 
to  evaluate  the relationship between “economic freedom” as dependent variable and 
“aid” and “IMF credit” as independent variables. The estimation is based upon data 
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the Heritage Index of 
Economic Freedom. In contrast to previous research, our results allow the rejection of 
the hypothesis that IMF credit increases economic freedom and that aid is not contribut-
ing to economic freedom. The estimation results suggest that, firstly, aid is positively 
correlated with economic freedom, and secondly, that IMF credit is negatively corre-
lated with economic freedom. Taking IMF credit as proxy for conditional aid, we con-
clude that for the period of observation it could not be shown that countries can be 
forced to economic freedom by aid conditions. 
 
Keywords: aid, economic freedom, IMF credit, economic development 
JEL classification: F35, O19, P10  
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Zusammenfassung 
Der Beitrag untersucht die empirischen Beziehungen zwischen ökonomischer Freiheit 
einerseits und allgemeiner Entwicklungshilfe bzw. IWF-Krediten als Approximation für 
konditionierte Entwicklungshilfe andererseits. Dazu wird zunächst die aktuelle Literatur 
zu  Fragen  der  ökonomischen  Entwicklung,  der  ökonomischen  Freiheit,  finanzieller 
Entwicklungshilfe  und  IWF-Krediten  dargestellt.  Ein  einfaches  Panel-Regressions-
modell,  mit  „ökonomischer  Freiheit“  als  abhängiger  Variable  und  „allgemeiner  Ent-
wicklungshilfe“ und IWF-Kredite“ als unabhängige Variablen, dient dann als Ausgangs-
punkt für die empirische Untersuchung. Die Daten wurden aus dem World Development 
Indicators-Datensatz der Weltbank und aus dem Heritage Index der ökonomischen Frei-
heit gewonnen. Im Gegensatz zu früheren Untersuchungen können wir die Hypothesen, 
dass allgemeine Entwicklungshilfe freiheitsbegrenzend wirkt während IWF-Kredite die 
ökonomische Freiheit erhöhen, ablehnen. Unsere Schätzergebnisse zeigen, dass allge-
meine Entwicklungshilfe positiv und IWF-Kredite negativ mit ökonomischer Freiheit 
korreliert sind. Es zeigt sich, dass Länder mit Hilfe von konditionierter Entwicklungshil-
fe nicht zu ökonomischer Freiheit gezwungen werden können. 
 
Schlagworte:  Ökonomische  Freiheit,  Entwicklungshilfe,  IMF-Kredite,  wirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung 
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1  Introduction  
A controversial issue discussed in the literature is whether foreign aid leads to increas-
ing economic growth in recipient countries (see e.g. Hudson 2004, pp. 185-6). Rather 
unambiguous is, however, the scholarly debate on whether economic freedom is favour-
able for economic growth. Current literature on economic development finds positive 
correlation  between  economic  freedom  and  economic  development  (see  e.g.  Miles, 
Feulner & O’Grady 2005, p. 18, Powell & Ryan 2005, and De Haan 2003) and also sug-
gests that economic freedom is a precondition for economic development (Pasicolan & 
Fitzgerald 2002, pp. 7-8). If this relationship holds then, to promote economic growth, 
foreign aid should increase, or at least not negatively affect, economic freedom within 
the recipient country. Otherwise economic growth initiated by aid, e.g. via the invest-
ment channel, could be interfered with by negative effects of aid on economic freedom. 
However, the literature indicates that at least some forms of foreign aid act system pre-
serving and support rent seeking behaviour. The discussion is linked to the ‘curse of 
natural resources’ debate and in this respect, research indicates that foreign aid, as well 
as,  natural  resources  have  a  negative  impact  on  democracy  (Djankov,  Montalvo  & 
Reynal-Querol 2005, pp. 8-17). 
Thus the objective of the present study is to examine whether different forms of foreign 
aid affect economic freedom and, therefore, economic growth in recipient countries. 
Answers are sought mainly to the question whether overall foreign aid and conditional 
support promote or impede economic freedom? To examine this, panel analysis is used 
with the “Heritage Index of Economic Freedom” as dependent variable and “official de-
velopment assistance” and “IMF credit” as independent variables, while controlling for 
other variables considered of importance in the literature. 
Previous research on economics of aid found that unconditional foreign aid is, if not ut-
terly insignificant, negatively correlated with economic freedom (see e.g. Vásquez 1998, 
p. 279). Conditional support, however, as in the case of IMF credit, is found to increase 
economic freedom and is therefore regarded as more successful in supporting economic 
development (Boockmann & Dreher 2003, pp. 637-47).1 However, whilst these previ-
ous studies usually refer either to official development assistance or to support by inter-
national financial institutions (e.g. International Monetary Fund) this study includes both 
variables to examine the relationship between economic freedom and different forms of 
foreign aid at the same time. Furthermore, contrary to previous studies, which usually 
use  the Economic Freedom Index provided by the Fraser Institute (see Gwartney & 
Lawson 2005), in this study the Economic Freedom Index from the Heritage Foundation 
                                                 
1  Boockmann & Dreher (2003) find that the number of programs, not the amount of credit increases 
economic freedom.   
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is used.2 This index is, in many respects, similar to the Economic Freedom Index by the 
Fraser Institute but it has the advantage of being available at an annual basis.3 
Section 2 discusses the relationship between economic growth and freedom and how 
foreign  aid  might  influence  economic  freedom.  Section  3  describes  the  estimation 
method and data used and presents and discusses empirical results. The summary and 
discussion of the findings are presented in the last part of the paper. 
                                                 
2  The data is available at www.heritage.org/research/features/index/index.cfm. 
3  The economic freedom index provided by the Fraser Institute is available at five year frequency until 
2000; only after 2000 it is available at annual frequency (see Gwartney & Lawson 2005). For a com-
parison of these two indicators see e.g. De Haan and Sturm (2000) and Hanke & Walters (1997).  
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2  Interrelations between aid, economic freedom and economic de-
velopment 
One of the overarching objectives of foreign aid is, beside emergency aid as is for ex-
ample given in case of a starvation disaster, to stimulate economic growth of recipient 
countries.  However,  despite  of  a large amount of foreign aid flowing to developing 
countries  over  the  years,  recipient  countries  usually  remained  poor  or  even  became 
poorer (UNDP 1996, p.1). Especially in the 1990s in respect to aid enthusiasm amongst 
donors declined (Hudson 2004, p. 185) along with the extent of aid flows (see e.g. Col-
lier & Dollar 2004, p. 244, and Addison et al. 2005, 991-6 for aid volumes to Sub-
Saharan Africa). This observation let economists to rethink whether and under what cir-
cumstances foreign aid stimulates growth. Empirical literature discussed this issue quite 
extensively in recent years. In a nutshell, the early strand of empirical literature indicates 
that aid has a positive effect on growth (e.g. Papanek 1972). However a second strand of 
literature questions these findings. For example, Mosley et al. (1987) and Boone (1996) 
find no relationship between aid and growth for developing countries; it is rather the 
case that aid increases the size of government. The most recent strands of literature, 
however, suggest that aid is growth enhancing when it meets a favourable environment 
in the recipient countries (see e.g. Addison et al. 2005 for a literature overview). 
An important element of such a favourable environment seems to be an encouraging 
economic climate or in other words, a market system based on economic freedom. The 
empirical literature indicates that economic freedom is positively related to economic 
growth. For example Scully and Slottje (1991), De Vanssay and Spindler (1994), Islam 
(1996), Hanke and Walters (1997), Easton and Walker (1997), Dawson (1998), and 
Heckelman and Stroup (2000) find that economic freedom is positively related to the 
level  of  economic  development  and  economic  growth.4  However,  De  Haan  (2003) 
points out that these studies usually do not consider all relevant estimation problems. He 
also notes that studies which include these considerations find only a positive change of 
economic freedom is related to economic growth (De Haan & Sturm 2000, Sturm and 
De Haan 2001, and Pitlik 2002). 
These findings, especially that aid can be growth enhancing when it meets a favourable 
environment and that a positive change in freedom is growth enhancing, suggest that the 
relationship between aid and economic freedom is relevant for economic growth. The 
question ariseing in particular is how aid may influence economic freedom, and thus 
economic growth. 
The literature on aid and economic freedom identifies different transmission paths of aid 
on economic freedom and growth. On the positive side aid can be a means of growth 
enhancing public investment, which could stimulate additional private capital flows to-
                                                 
4  See for a literature overview De Haan (2003).  
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wards developing countries. Public investment based on foreign aid is financed without 
the need to tax domestic citizens and can, therefore, increase economic freedom (Powell 
& Ryan 2005, p. 13, Vásquez 1998, p. 277). The little empirical evidence there is for 
economic freedom enhancing foreign aid is reasoned for by various claims which try not 
only to explain why aid impulses do not translate into increased economic freedom, but 
also why foreign aid may lead to a reduction of economic freedom. The channels of ex-
planation include the use of aid for neither freedom nor growth enhancing policy, such 
as the increase of public consumption or financing of projects preferred by domestic 
governments instead of investment (Vásquez 1998, p. 278) and the characteristic of aid 
to increase the size and scope of governments – absolutely and relative to private sector 
(Powell & Ryan 2005, pp. 2, 13). The reduced need for domestic taxation leads to a re-
duced pressure for policy reform (Collier & Dollar 2004, pp. 262-3). It is also identified 
in the literature that aid may negatively harm economic freedom because of the specific 
provision of foreign aid by donor countries. Thus, aid seems to be mainly distributed to 
countries  whose  governments  maintain  growth-thwarting  policies  (Vásquez  1998,  p. 
278) and leads to propping up of institutions resisting economic liberalization (Hanke & 
Walters 1997, p. 144, Powell & Ryan 2005, p. 11). Therefore, the expectance of aid may 
lead to reduced efforts of liberal reform and to a reduction of pre-cautionary measures 
(Boockmann & Dreher 2003, p. 636, Collier & Dollar 2004, p. 257).5 Accordingly, 
Hanke & Walters (1997, p. 144) conclude that foreign aid is not a necessary condition 
for economic growth and Powell & Ryan (2005, p. 2) even state that aid is an “anti-
market force” which leads to “expulsion of productive groups, suppression of private 
trade, restriction of the inflow of foreign capital, confiscation of property, forced collec-
tivization, takeover of foreign enterprises, discouragement of agriculture, support of un-
viable projects, and import substitution.” This leads to the conclusion that overall aid 
reduces economic freedom. 
The long-lasting debate of aid effectiveness led to two possible measures, selective and 
conditional aid6, which may reduce the negative effects of aid on economic freedom and 
growth, while not abandoning the potential benefits from foreign aid. This paper focuses 
on conditional support in comparison to overall aid, while selective aid, where countries 
have to meet preconditions before qualifying for donor support, will not be included in 
the empirical analysis due to a lack of data. Conditional support has the advantage that 
specific agreed upon policy measures can be implemented which directly increase eco-
nomic freedom. Besides this direct effect, conditional support could stimulate private 
capital flows as it could work as a kind of official approval of a positive economic envi-
ronment (Vásquez 1998, p. 282). Other potentially indirect effects of conditional sup-
port are listed by Boockmann & Dreher (2003, p. 635) and include the negotiation proc-
ess with donors potentially leading to political advantages of pro-market reform politi-
                                                 
5  For example Knack (2001) finds that aid is positively correlated with corruption.  
6  For a discussion see e.g. Hudson (2004, p. 188).  
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cians, the involvement of civil society possibly encouraging a liberal consensus, a lack 
of reform capacity in developing countries may be overcome by welcome advice, reform 
programs which underlie conditional support can be improved in their efficiency by 
learning from recipients countries experience, and that complementary training may en-
hance domestic capacities to reform. These potential advantages of conditional support 
are, however, questioned by the argument that promises about reforms are seldom kept 
(Hudson 2004, p. 188) and that, from an institutional perspective, even lenders, i.e. de-
velopment agencies, are not interested in proper reforms, which would make them obso-
lete (Vásquez 1998, p. 282). However, since the arguments against the effective use of 
conditional support do not indicate that conditional support would be more harmful than 
unconditional aid and since there are arguments that the positive effects of aid can be 
better ensured if conditions are in place, we conclude that conditional support is ex-
pected to yield better results with regard to economic freedom. 
The discussion of conditional support versus overall aid leads to two hypotheses: Firstly, 
overall  aid  reduces  economic  freedom.  Secondly,  conditional  support  increases  eco-
nomic freedom.  
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3   Testing the relationship between economic freedom and aid 
Data and method 
The first issue with regard to the empirical analysis of the relationship between aid and 
economic freedom is the decision of which available data can appropriately measure 
economic freedom. There exist two indices for this purpose: the Economic Freedom In-
dex of the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom.7  
Both indices try to include the whole range of government activities which are related to 
economic freedom and market friendliness, e.g. property rights, and freedom of transac-
tion. Although both indices are somewhat different in their methodology, e.g. the Fraser 
index consist of 23 components classified in five core components (Gwartney & Law-
son 2005) whilst the Heritage Foundation index consist of 50 components classified in 
ten core components (Beach & Miles 2006, p. 56), a comparison by Hanke and Walters 
(1997) indicates that their results are comparable and similar; both indices are highly 
correlated with each other (ibid, p. 135-6). However, both indices have some advantages 
and disadvantages. 
The Fraser index is available from 1970 to 2003, however not for all years and not for 
all countries. The first draw in 1970 contains data for 53 countries, after that the index is 
available at five-year intervals extended successively by further countries until 2000. 
Since then the index is available on an annual basis and contains information for 123 
countries. The advantage is that the index allows comparison for more than tree dec-
ades. In contrast, the advantage of the Heritage Foundation index can be found in that it 
is available on an annual basis however only for a shorter time period, from 1995 to 
2006. Furthermore, it is also available for around 140 countries for nearly the whole 
time period.8 
To serve the purpose of our study the Heritage Foundation index seems to be more fa-
vourable for two reasons. Firstly, in terms of time period, the shorter availability seems 
not to be disturbing, quite the opposite, it may rather solve some problems. In particular, 
the important advantage of the use of more current data is the regime switch in devel-
opment policy and the abolition of communist regimes in the 1990s which led to struc-
tural breaks (see Collier and Dollar, p. 244), hence the use of the time period from 1995 
onwards seems to be favourable to capture the actual influence of development aid on 
economic freedom. Second, in terms of the number of observations the Heritage Foun-
dation is superior. In particular it includes a higher number of countries and is available 
                                                 
7  Another index is provided by the Freedom House, however this index rather measures political free-
dom  and  civil  liberties,  than  economic  freedom  (see  e.g.  Hanke  &  Walters  1997  and 
http://www.freedomhouse.org). 
8  It started in 1995 with information for 106 countries and extended the countries included already in 
1996 to a number of 143 countries. In 2005 it is available for 159 countries.  
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on an annual basis. Hence, the Heritage Foundation index is used. The core components 
of this index are: trade policy, fiscal burden, government intervention, monetary policy, 
capital flows, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and in-
formal market activity. For a description of the contents of the core components see an-
nex 1. The index decreases with increasing economic freedom. 
The second issue to be considered is which available data can be employed to test the 
hypotheses with regard to conditional support and overall aid. As a measure for overall 
aid we use the aid per capita data provided by the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, which are calculated from OECD data of aid flows including both, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and Official Aid (OA),9  and from World Bank’s popu-
lation data. Both measures of aid meet the same specifications, e.g. they bear a grant 
element of at least 25 percent. Official development assistance is provided in various 
different frames: unconditional, conditional, and selective aid; therefore it is regarded as 
appropriate approximation for overall aid. As a measure for conditional support we use 
IMF disbursements to member countries per capita generated from original IMF data 
about  countries’  transactions  with  the  fund  and  World  Banks  Population  data.  IMF 
transactions are not included in the overall aid, since they do not bear a grant element. 
All forms of IMF disbursement are conditional (see IMF 2005). The conditionality of 
IMF credit is implemented by a letter of intent in which the recipient countries spell out 
plans to reform. The first tranche is usually disbursed on this promise, while further 
tranches are disbursed after observing progress in the fulfilment of the conditions. The 
general objective of IMF conditionality is to resolve a country’s balance of payments 
difficulties by policy measures which address the underlying structural problems. Ex-
amples can be found in the reduction of public debt and the liberalization of prices and 
trade which can be generally regarded as economic freedom enhancing. Therefore, IMF 
disbursements are regarded as best available data for conditional support. 
With respect to the availability of these variables our sample consists of 104 countries 
covering the years 1995 to 2004. The selection includes countries for which data of the 
Heritage Economic Freedom Index is available and which received aid in the period of 
observation. To get a first impression on the data, table 1 presents some descriptive sta-
tistics. 
As shown in table 1 economic freedom of the sample countries as measured by the Heri-
tage Foundation seems to increase since 1996. The average score of the countries de-
creased from 3.32 in 1996 to 3.08 in 2004, which indicates an increase in economic 
freedom. Similarly the standard deviation decreased which indicates that the differences 
                                                 
9  There is no difference between ODA and OA other than that ODA is directed towards “traditional” 
developing countries (included in part I of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
list), while OA is directed towards more advanced and transition economies (included in part II of the 
DAC list) (OECD 2006a, 2006b).  
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between the countries considered declined. In contrast the total sum of aid received by 
the sample countries shows no uniform picture. From 1995 to 1997 the flow of aid de-
creased dramatically from 43.3 billion US dollar to 33.5 billion US dollar. After that de-
crease the extent of aid flow increased slightly resulting in another slump in 2000. How-
ever, the amount of aid seems to be more or less constant since 1999 with a sum of 
around 38 billion US dollar. Whilst the extent of aid seems to be constant this is not the 
case for IMF disbursements. The figures clearly indicate that IMF disbursements are 
high in time of a crisis and low otherwise, and that they show an overall increasing 
trend. 
Table 1: 
Development of economic freedom, aid, and IMF disbursements in the sample 
Year 
Variable 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Mean  3.28  3.32  3.27  3.23  3.20  3.20  3.16  3.13  3.09  3.08 
Standard deviation  0.58  0.63  0.63  0.63  0.62  0.63  0.64  0.60  0.57  0.57 
Economic 
Freedom  
Index  Growth rate [in %]    1.4  -1.5  -1.1  -1.0  -0.1  -1.3  -0.8  -1.2  -0.5 
Total [ in billion US $]  43.3  39.3  33.5  36.1  37.9  34.7  36.3  38.0  38.5   
Aid   
Growth rate [in %]    -9.3  -14.7  7.7  4.9  -8.3  4.5  4.6  1.5   
Total [in billion US $]  27.0  8.2  23.0  28.5  14.5  9.7  31.0  33.4  29.1  6.4  IMF dis-
bursements   Growth rate [in %]    -69.6  180.7  23.8  -49.2  -32.8  218.4  7.7  -12.8  -77.9 
Source: Heritage Foundation, World Bank, and IMF; own calculations. 
To examine the effect of aid on economic freedom empirically we use OLS panel esti-
mation. The simple model specification to test whether overall aid and conditional sup-
port effects the change of economic freedom is as follows: 
DFREEit = a + ß1AIDit + ß2IMFit + ui + εit    (1) 
where DFREEit is the year to year change of the value of the Heritage Economic Free-
dom Index of a country, AIDit is the extent of official development assistance per capita, 
IMFit is the amount of IMF credit per capita a country received in the respective year, a 
is a constant term, and ui + εit is treated as an error term consisting of two components, 
an country specific component which does not vary over time, and a remainder compo-
nent which is assumed to be uncorrelated over time. 
A standard issue in panel data econometrics is whether to employ a random or a fixed 
estimation model. In our case the Hausman test does not argue against the use of a ran-
dom effects model therefore it can be assumed that the individual effects are uncorre-
lated with the other regressors, and a random effects model seems to be appropriate. 
Another concern with regard to the above mentioned model specification is that this 
simple model design may not be exhaustive in explaining the change in economic free- 
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dom. That is, the simple regression model should be recalculated under control of other 
variables. Because of the lack of a theoretical model which explains the impacts on eco-
nomic freedom we are considering various variables used in the empirical literature so 
far. Determinants that might influence changes of economic freedom in a country might 
be GDP per capita growth, macroeconomic shocks such as declines of GDP per capita 
growth rates of 5 percent points, changes in the terms of trade, terms of trade shocks 
such as a 5 percent deterioration in terms of trade indices, changes in the political sys-
tem indicated by a political rights index, the primary commodity dependence measured 
as the share of fuel exports as percent of total exports, as well as the level of human 
ability to stand in for economic freedom measured by school enrolment indicators.10 
Various other measures that would in general be regarded as important for economic 
freedom, such as the level of corruption, must be excluded from the set of independent 
variables since they are part of the economic freedom index of the Heritage Foundation. 
We start our estimation procedure by estimating the core model, which is then extended 
by  other  explanatory  variables  to  evaluate  their  influence  on  the  results  of  the  core 
model. To test the robustness of the results we conduct the same procedure for two sub-
samples. Finally, as part of the discussion of the results we conduct a level estimation of 
economic freedom, to detect possible selection differences between IMF support coun-
tries and overall aid reception countries. 
Empirical results 
The results of the various estimations are reported in table 2. Since the economic free-
dom index is a composite index consisting also of qualitative variables, the coefficients 
indicating the quantitative relationships between the dependent and independent vari-
ables are difficult to interpret. We are, therefore, restricting the discussion to the signs 
and significance of the results, while still reporting the coefficients. 
The estimation of the core model yields a surprising result; while the coefficient of 
overall aid is significantly negative; the coefficient of IMF credit is significant and posi-
tive. The economic freedom index increases with lower economic freedom; a positive 
change of the index indicates therefore less economic freedom. Accordingly, a positive 
coefficient of the IMF credit measure indicates that a positive amount of IMF credit 
transferred to a country is related with decreasing economic freedom. The Wald χ
2 test 
statistic shows the estimation model as having advantages over a pure random model 
                                                 
10  Similar Brockman and Dreher (2005) use data for school enrolment and export figures; Collier & 
Dollar (2004, p. 251) stress the importance of macroeconomic and terms of trade shocks; De Haan & 
Sturm (2003) emphasize the importance of political rights for economic freedom. All data used here 
is drawn or based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators, except for the political right in-
dex, which is taken from Freedom House (2006). A review of the correlation matrix indicates no 
multicollinearity between all variables considered.  
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and can be interpreted. Thus, from the estimation of the core model we could conclude 
that the first hypothesis, overall aid decreases economic freedom, can be rejected and 
the second hypothesis, IMF credit enhances economic freedom, can also be rejected.11 
However,  before  drawing  conclusions  we  consider  seven  other  possible  explanatory 
variables. 
Table 2: 
Estimation results on changes in the Economic Freedom Index (whole sample) 
  Dependent variable: Annual change in economic freedom 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Aid, pc  -0.0002*  -0.0002*  -0.0002*  -0.0002*  -0.0004**  -0.0003*  -0.0004*  -0.0005**  -0.0005 
IMF, pc  0.0005**  0.0005**  0.0006***  0.0005**  0.0005**  0.0005**  0.0004*  0.0006**  0.0005** 
GDP, pc growth    -0.0007              0.0005 
GDP shock dummy      -0.0217            -0.0072 
Pol. rights, change        0.0139          0.0046 
Fuel exports          0.0003        0.0000 
ToT, change            0.0340      0.0935 
ToT shock dummy              -0.0174    0.0043 
School enrolment                -0.0002  -0.0001 
Constant  -0.0308*** -0.0290*** -0.0287*** -0.0304*** -0.0347***  -0.0222**  -0.0197*  -0.0032  -0.0015 
No. of countries  104  102  104  103  101  72  72  102  63 
No. of observations  807  792  803  799  663  461  461  435  233 
Prob > χ
2  0.0084  0.0188  0.0130  0.0116  0.0018  0.0537  0.0477  0.0077  0.5468 
* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level. 
 
The growth rate of per capita GDP is an indicator for economic development. If positive 
economic development were positively related with economic freedom we would expect 
a significant negative coefficient. The second row in table 2 reports a negative but non-
significant coefficient, which is not interfering with the coefficients of the core model. 
We conclude that the variable adds no value to the estimation and drop it again. 
The inclusion of a dummy variable for GDP growth shocks is the next step. We consider 
the variable as important because it can be argued that the negative impact of IMF credit 
on economic freedom could simply result from the fact that credit is only provided in 
times of serious economic trouble. Thus, the crisis may reduce economic freedom and it 
is therefore not the IMF support, which is provided at the same time, impeding eco-
nomic freedom. The variable (1 for differences in growth rates of minus five percent 
points or less, 0 for all other cases) becomes insignificant (see row 3 in table 2). We 
                                                 
11  Since one could argue that the impact of the IMF conditionality and aid acts retarded we re-estimated 
the model with lagged variables, however, this does not change the results.   
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conclude from this estimation that the IMF credit variable in the core model does not 
show  a  positive  sign  because  of  an  unobserved  negative  effect  of  macroeconomic 
shocks on economic freedom. 
In the fourth estimation we include a variable that measures the change of the political 
rights index of the Freedom House. We are arguing that political freedom may be linked 
with economic freedom and positive changes in one index may be related to positive 
changes of the other. The estimation shows a positive coefficient which remains, how-
ever, not significant. The inclusion of the variable does not change the significance of 
the core model and does not add value to the explanatory power of the core model. 
In a further estimation (see row 6) we include a changes-in-terms-of-trade variable. The 
idea behind the inclusion is that a favourable foreign trade positions, e.g. increases in 
the terms of trade, may result in less opposition against trade liberalisation and may 
therefore lead to increased trade openness and economic freedom. The estimation results 
in an insignificant coefficient for the terms of trade variable. 
We then construct a terms of trade shock variable indicating a drop in the countries’ 
terms of trade index of at least 10 percent. We consider this variable as being of interest 
since the IMF may react on a balance of payment crises, which may consist of economic 
freedom decreasing because governments restrict the freedom of trade due to crises. The 
inclusion of the variable may, therefore, capture a so far undetected effect borne by the 
IMF credit measure. The estimation shows a negative sign of the coefficient, just as in 
the case of the GDP shock dummy, but it also remains insignificant. The significance of 
the core model remains. We conclude that the coefficient of the IMF credit variable is 
not overlaid by a terms of trade shock effect. 
Finally we include a school enrolment variable to capture the capacity of a society to 
understand the advantages of the abstract concept of economic freedom and to articulate 
the will to demand economic freedom (see row 8). We test various measures of school 
enrolment. Gross secondary school enrolment yields the best fitting results, however 
still not significant at a 10 percent level. 
We then estimate a model including all potentially explanatory variables (see row 9), 
which leads to reduced explanatory power compared to the core model. We then under-
take estimations with various combinations of the explanatory variables (not reported in 
table 2) without being able to increase the power of the estimation compared to the core 
model. 
The results of the estimation models presented in table 2 can be summarized as follows: 
First, aid per capita is positively correlated with economic freedom. Second, IMF credit 
shows significant positive signs in all estimation models and is therefore negatively cor-
related with economic freedom. Other variables are insignificant and their interrelation 
with economic freedom can hardly be interpreted.  
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Robustness tests 
Before we draw conclusions regarding the hypotheses and interpret the results we are 
testing  the  robustness of the results by conducting the same exercise with two sub-
samples. The first includes with the 24 sub-Sahara African countries of the sample, one 
of the least developed region in the world. The second includes all countries but only 
data from 2000 onwards. The main findings of the estimations of the whole model are 
verified by the results of the sub-sample estimations (see table 3). The model including 
the limited time frame confirms the results of the above analysis, aid is positively and 
IMF credit is negatively correlated with economic freedom. The core model of the sub-
Sahara African sub-sample leads to insignificant results regarding the aid variable, while 
IMF credit has a significant negative impact on economic freedom in African countries 
too. 
Table 3: 
Estimation results on changes in the Economic freedom Index (sub-samples) 
  Dependent variable: Annual change in economic freedom 
  Sub-Sahara African sub-sample  2000-2004 sub-sample 
Aid, pc  -0.0005  -0.0006 
*** 




Constant  -0.0359  -0.0125 
No. of countries  24  104 
No. of observations  186  416 
Prob > χ
2  0.0566  0.0005 
* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level. 
Discussion of the results 
After considering various explanatory variables in extension of the core model and after 
testing the robustness of the results by conducting sub-sample estimations, we can now 
conclude that the first impression following from the estimation of the core model is 
persistent. 
The hypothesis which claims overall aid to be decreasing economic freedom can be re-
jected. The estimations indicate that aid flows are negatively correlated to changes in the 
Economic Freedom Index. 
The second hypothesis, that IMF credit is economic freedom enhancing can be rejected. 
The results of the estimation indicate that financial IMF support is economic freedom 
decreasing. This result is robust to changes of samples. It is also evident from the above  
__________________________________________________________________  IWH 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 8/2006  17
analysis that IMF credit is worse than overall aid regarding the effect on economic free-
dom. 
The estimation results raise two questions: why IMF credit has negative effects on eco-
nomic freedom and why IMF credit is less favourable than overall aid. The first question 
could be answered by blaming the negative effects of conditioned aid, as outlined in sec-
tion 2 to IMF credit, and by arguing that the imposed conditions are seldom fulfilled. 
We could also blame all the negative effects of unconditioned aid to explain the nega-
tive impacts of IMF credit on economic freedom. What we cannot explain by these 
claims is why IMF credit is less favourable than aid. We are therefore returning to the 
data to bring some light in the dark.12 
As stated above and documented in annex 1, the economic freedom index is constructed 
of 10 sub-categories of economic freedom. In order to find out how IMF credit is affect-
ing the different sub-categories we use a sub-sample of observations in which cases of a 
positive amount of IMF credit meet an increasing economic freedom index. The sub-
sample comprises of 106 observations. Which sub-categories are worsening in the re-
spective periods in the respective countries is reported in figure 1. 
Figure 1: 
Cases of sub-category worsening in the IMF credit and positive economic freedom in-
dex change cases 


























Source: Heritage Foundation; own calculation. 
                                                 
12  Another idea was to test whether IMF credit and aid are distributed differently between countries 
with different degrees of freedom. Therefore, we regressed aid per capita and IMF credit per capita 
on the level of the economic freedom variable. We found no significant result, which could provide 
evidence for a different distribution.   
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The figure shows the fiscal burden sub-category being of outstanding importance for the 
worsening of the economic freedom index in the cases of IMF credit. While all other 
categories are worsening in less than a third of the cases, the fiscal burden worsens eco-
nomic freedom in more than half of the cases. The fiscal burden sub-category comprises 
three measures: the top marginal income tax rate, the top marginal corporate tax rate, 
and the year-to-year change in government expenditure as a percent of GDP. The first 
two of these measures may be affected by IMF conditionality, which usually includes a 
fiscal tightening to reduce government debt. It seems that the fiscal consolidation is un-
dertaken in most of the cases by increasing taxes instead of reducing spending.13 Ex-
penditure may also not be reduced because of the availability of resources provided by 
IMF credit. At the same time, shrinking GDP, caused by an IMF support-raising crisis, 
leads  to  increasing  figures  of  expenditure  per  GDP  even  if  spending  is  constant  or 
slightly shrinking. Thus, the negative effect of IMF credit on the fiscal burden measure 
of the Heritage index is comprehensible. This negative effect tops possible positive ef-
fects of IMF conditionality on other sub-categories of the Freedom index and leads to 
the overall negative impact on the economic freedom index. 
                                                 
13  Bookmann & Dreher (2003, p. 646) state that IMF credit go hand in hand with increasing taxes.  
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4  Conclusions 
The analysis of the interdependences between overall aid and IMF credit, as measure for 
conditional support on the one side and economic freedom on the other side demon-
strates clearly that the introduction of conditions on aid does not increase the economic 
freedom, as measured by the economic freedom index, in aid receiving countries. It can 
be concluded that the postulation of post-drawing conditions has not been helpful in or-
der to increase economic freedom, as measured by the economic freedom index, during 
the period of observation. If the aforementioned positive relation between the economic 
freedom index and economic growth holds, then conditional support was just as little 
helpful to initiate growth processes. This could eventually lead to poverty reduction and 
economic development. 
However, we are also concluding that the effect of conditional IMF credit on the eco-
nomic freedom index is concentrated on one specific sub-category of the index, namely 
the fiscal burden. This category includes measures for tax rates as well as for public 
spending in relation to GDP. If one of the conditions of IMF support would be fiscal 
consolidation and if countries would fulfil this condition by increasing taxes and not by 
reducing expenditure, then the condition will lead to less economic freedom, as meas-
ured by the index. In the index of the Heritage Foundation the positive effect of such a 
policy, that is to say the reduction of public deficits or even debt, is not defined as in-
creasing economic freedom. It could be argued however that such a policy could in-
crease economic freedom, e.g. by less public competition on credit markets. This condi-
tion is aimed to increase economic stability rather than economic freedom and is respon-
sible for the overall negative impression of conditional IMF support because it excels 
other freedom enhancing conditions such as the demand to liberalize prices and foreign 
trade. This is also due to the specific weights of the sub-categories in the index. Thus, 
we cannot conclude from the effect of the IMF credit on the economic freedom index 
that the IMF conditions do not contribute to a favourable economic environment, al-
though the index suggests it. 
Therefore further research should evaluate other variations of aid, such as selective aid, 
which is only provided if pre-conditions are fulfilled and other forms of conditional aid 
with conditions on public spending instead of conditions on public deficits. 
Assuming, as stated initially, that IMF credit is an appropriate approximation for condi-
tional support and that the economic freedom index of the Heritage Foundation is an ap-
propriate approximation for economic freedom, we must conclude that the establish-
ment of conditions of the international donor community cannot force economic free-
dom in developing countries.  
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Annex 1 
Components of the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom 
Area  Core components  Contents 
I  Trade policy   Weighted average tariff rate 
Non-tariff barriers 
Corruption in the custom service 
II  Fiscal  burden  of  govern-
ment 
Top marginal income tax rate 
Top marginal corporate tax rate 
Year-to-year change in government expenditures as a percent of GDP 
III  Government  intervention 
in the economy 
Government consumption as a percentage of the economy 
Government ownership of businesses and industries 
Share  of  government  revenues  from  state-owned  enterprises  and  government 
ownership of property 
Economic output produced by the government 
IV  Monetary policy  Weighted average inflation rate from 1995 to 2004 
V  Capital  flows  and  foreign 
investment 
Foreign investment code 
Restrictions on foreign ownership of business 
Restrictions on industries and companies open to foreign investors 
Restrictions and performance requirements on foreign companies 
Foreign ownership of land 
Equal treatment under the law for both foreign 
and domestic companies 
Restrictions on repatriation of earnings 
Restrictions on capital transactions 
Availability of local financing for foreign companies 
VI  Banking and finance  Government ownership of financial institutions 
Restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to open branches and subsidiaries 
Government influence over the allocation of credit 
Government regulations that inhibit financial activity 
Freedom to offer all types of financial services, securities, and insurance policies 
VII  Wages and prices  Minimum wage laws 
Freedom to set prices privately without government influence 
Government price controls 
Extent to which government price controls are used 
Government subsidies to businesses that affect prices 
VIII  Property rights  Freedom from government influence over the judicial system 
Commercial code defining contracts 
Sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes 
Government expropriation of property 
Corruption within the judiciary 
Delays in receiving judicial decisions and/or enforcement 
Legally granted and protected private property 
VIIII  Regulation  Licensing requirements to operate a business 
Ease of obtaining a business license 
Corruption within the bureaucracy 
Labor regulations, such as established workweeks, paid vacations, and parental 
leave, as well as selected labor regulations 
Environmental, consumer safety, and worker health regulations 
Regulations that impose a burden on business 
X  Informal market activity  Smuggling 
Piracy of intellectual property in the informal market 
Agricultural production supplied on the informal market 
Manufacturing supplied on the informal market 
Services supplied on the informal market 
Transportation supplied on the informal market 
Labor supplied on the informal market 
Source: Beach & Miles 2006, pp. 58-74. 